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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF U I All,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20060904-CA

vs.

JACK WILKINSON,
Detaulanl/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Aft &&

STATEM» *

>F .lURjsmrTTON

This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court erred in denying Wilkinson's motion to suppress evidence
,n'ii;iiir I as ;i ii",nil cj ,in ilkj;jl sean.ii anil -,cr IIM,

I'ln , ihsur puvscnis a ipiesln'ii i'i law

reviewed for correctness. State v. Brake "o(U I; 1 95, *\\ 15, 103 P.3d 699. This issue
was preserved in a motion to suppress (R. 103-97).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The text of all relevant statutory and constitutional provisions is set forth in the
Addenda.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

Jack Wilkinson appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the
Fourth District Court after he was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony; and false information, a class C misdemeanor.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition

Jack Wilkinson was charged by Information filed in Fourth District Court on or
about February 11, 2005 with possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-98(2)(a)(i), and false information, a class C
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-507(1) (R. 2-1).
A preliminary hearing was held before Judge Samuel McVey on August 23, 2005
and Wilkinson was bound over for trial on both charges upon a finding of probable cause
(R. 81, 208). He was arraigned on September 13, 2005 and pled "not guilty" (R. 210: 3).
On October 24, 2005 Wilkinson filed a motion to suppress pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution,
alleging that he was unlawfully detained without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
(R. 103-97). An evidentiary hearing was held on the motion on November 29, 2005 and
the trial court denied the motion (R. 117, 127-23, 209: 46-47).
A jury trial was held on May 3, 2005 and Wilkinson was convicted of both
charges (R. 189-88,212).
On July 10, 2006 Wilkinson was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 0-5 years
in the Utah State Prison (R. 202-01).
2

On October 2, 2006 a motion to reinstate time to appeal was filed It was granted
on October 4, 2006, On Septei nbei 21, 2006 a notice of appea .-^ i.i, w An amended
i lotice :)f appeal \ * as file d on October 30. 2006. '

• •

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
I'estimoiiy from Pi eliminai j • Hearing
Jeff Plank, a State Bureau of Investigation officer assumed to the Utah County
Major Crimes Task Force, stopped a vehicle around 12 South and 8th West traveling 35

who was.Novetta Ann Payne (R. 208: 6, 12). I lie talked and Payne informed Mm her
driver's license was suspended (R 2^8 V)
two passengers "vv ei e,

r

Av: was issued n citation HR 208; ]i} The

--

. . : / . -

Wilkinson gave Plank the name of "Bob Wilkinson" and a date of birth of "8-24-57" (R.
208: 7). Plank learned Wilkinson's true identity when "a K9 deputy (Deputy Williams)
stopped, and he actually depn
deployment, after he put his dog back into the car and did indicate on the vehicle on the
exterior and the interior, put the dog away and made mention to Bob as Jack, and so [he]
questioned mm

;

:

.

He knew him by name" (R. 208: 8).
Deputy Williams was "in the area" and responded to the scene at Plank's request
(\< 1()H b J11 "J1!- I'liiik (t ,tilled lluil if :'probabi
Williams in r<'<<pnm| Imi fluif lit1 "didn't k<rp itiwi n\ if (R. 208. H, 21) On redirect
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Plank was asked by the prosecutor, "[D]id you stop and wait for the K9 search to be done
or do you just continue right on writing your citation?" (R. 208: 22). Plank answered,
"Basically I was there writing the citation. I had my dispatch checking on the other
passengers in the vehicle to see if they had valid driver's licenses, things like that. So,
several minutes was the time lapse" (R. 208: 22). Plank estimated that the time lapse
between the stop and when Payne was given the citation was "six, seven minutes, eight
minutes, something like that" (R. 208: 22). Plank "didn't keep track of [the] times" and
could only "guess or estimate" (R. 208: 23). Within the first minute of the stop Plank had
requested a canine unit (R. 208: 23). It likely took a "couple" of minutes for the unit to
arrive (R. 208: 23). While the dog ran around the car Plank was in his car waiting for
dispatch to come back with information on the status of the driver (R. 208: 23-24). Plank
estimated that it probably took a minute for the dog to indicate on the vehicle (R. 208:
25).
The purpose of having the canine sniff around the vehicle was for the "ongoing
investigation11 (R. 208: 13). When asked why he was looking for narcotics, Plank stated,
"Just an investigation. He was in the area. I had contact with another detective on the
task force who was a K9 handle, and he was the one that actually sent him over" (R. 208:
13). Plank was subsequently asked, "But you had no reason to believe there were
narcotics?" (R. 208: 14). He replied, "Not really, no" (R. 208: 14).
The dog went around the exterior of the vehicle while the occupants remained
inside (R. 208: 14). When the dog indicated on the exterior of the driver's side door they
were asked to get out of the vehicle while the dog went inside (R. 208: 14). No narcotics
4

were found inside the vehicle (R. 208: 14). The dog also hit on the interior of the rear left
seat where Wilkinson had been sitting (R. 208: 15). Plank testified, "Once the K9
indicates on the exterior, everyone on the inside is basically subject to search as was the
interior (R. 208: 15).
Wilkinson had an outstanding warrant for his arrest and was taken into custody (R.
208: 6). He was searched and a little blue bag was found in his right pocket (R. 208: 7).
The bag and its contents were tested by the crime lab and methamphetamine weighing 20
milligrams was identified (R. 208: 12). A field test at the scene was also performed and
came back positive for methamphetamine (R. 208: 20). The bag was not tested for
fingerprints (R. 208: 18). Wilkinson told Plank, "if he would have remembered that the
bag was in his pocket, he would have gotten rid of i f (R. 208: 16-17). Wilkinson was
"in custody" when the statement was made but had not been given his Miranda rights (R.
208: 17). Plank indicated the statement was spontaneous rather than the result of
questioning (R. 208: 17). Wilkinson had previously been Terry frisked by Plank or
Burgon and no drugs were located (R. 208: 18).
There were four officers at the scene: Plank; his partner, Brandon Burgon;
Williams; and the original K9 officer Plank spoke to, Lane Critser (R. 208: 15-16).

B. Testimony at Suppression Hearing
In February of 2005 Novetta Payne was involved in a traffic stop for speeding (R.
209: 5-6). Jack Wilkinson was the left rear passenger seat and his girlfriend, Janice
Fusco, was sitting in the front passenger seat (R. 209: 6). The officer approached and
5

Payne immediately informed him she was driving on a suspended driver's license (R.
209: 7). The officer took her driver's license and returned to his vehicle and "a few
minutes—maybe 15 minutes later they—a truck pulled up with dogs" (R. 209: 7). She
thought it was approximately 10 or 15 minutes until the canine unit arrived but she
wasn't "sure" (R. 209: 7). She testified that it was longer than five minutes (R. 209: 9).
Payne "was wondering what was taking so long. And one thing I do remember is
because I was supposed to pick up her boyfriend from work, and I was going to be late. I
was late because of all this" (R. 209: 9-10).
Payne used to live with Fusco and that is how she came to know Wilkinson (R.
209: 10). Prior to the hearing she hadn't seen them in approximately seven months (R.
209: 10-11). At the time of the stop she saw Fusco almost every day and frequently
Wilkinson was there in the home they shared with his father (R. 209: 11). She did not
speak with them about her testimony (R. 209: 12).
Payne's criminal history includes multiple felony convictions for drug related
offenses and one false information conviction (R. 209: 13).
Janice Fusco is Wilkinson's girlfriend and has known him for over a year (R. 209:
15, 17). In February of 2005 she and Wilkinson were in a vehicle driven by Payne that
was pulled over for a traffic violation (R. 209: 15-16). Wilkinson was sitting behind
Payne (R. 209: 16). The officer spoke with Payne then went to his car for about 10 to 15
minutes" (R. 209: 16). "Just before" the officer came back the canine unit arrived (R.
209: 16-17).
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Fusco testified that the officers "checked" all of them and nothing was found on
any of them (R. 209: 22-23). She indicated that she "can never forget that incident
because, see, when we were checked, I—one of the officers touched me inappropriately
and I thought that was very uncomfortable" (R. 209: 22). When the officers checked
them the next time "from an officer that wasn't even at the scene that arrived there, and
then there was something on [Wilkinson]. And you know that—that didn't make any
sense because I thought he didn't have anything on him, I'm positive" (R. 209: 23). She
saw this officer "take something that wasn't there in the first place" from Wilkinson (R.
209: 23). She was certain it wasn't there before because "they checked so thoroughly"
during the earlier search (R. 209: 23). Fusco also testified that they "weren't doing drugs
at the time. We stopped doing drugs" (R. 209: 23).
Fusco didn't have any substantive conversations about her testimony with Payne
or defense counsel (R. 209: 28-29).

C. Testimony at Trial
L Testimony of Jeff Plank
On February 8, 2005 at approximately 8 p.m. Plank stopped an automobile for
speeding (R. 212: 63, 70). He approached and spoke with the driver, Nobetta Payne (R.
212: 63). Payne immediately informed him that her driver's license was suspended (R.
212: 63). Plank "retrieved her information and went back to my vehicle and confirmed
that it was suspended" (R. 212: 63).
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He also called Detective Lane Kritzer, a canine handler with the task force,
approximately a minute into the stop (R. 212: 71, 77). Plank testified that he called
Kritzer because he'd been running surveillance on a home in Provo and observed a
vehicle come and leave (R. 212: 72-73). He couldn't remember the make of the vehicle
or if it was a two-door or four-door he stopped, but he followed the vehicle that left the
house for 2-3 minutes before stopping it for speeding (R. 212: 73, 97-98). Plank did not
include this information in his incident report (R. 212: 73). He called the canine unit
because it's his "job. I do narcotics investigations" (R. 212: 74). Plank acknowledged
that it was his intent to conduct "a thorough investigation" on the vehicle (R. 212: 76).
After requesting the canine unit, he went back to the vehicle to try and find out
who else in the vehicle had a valid driver's license (R. 212: 64, 77-78). He obtained
names and dates of birth of the passengers, who both indicated their licenses were valid
(R. 212: 64, 78). Neither passenger had identification with them (R. 212: 64, 78). Plank
told them that he would go "check and see if you guys have a license on my computer"
(R. 212: 78). The other passenger indicated her license was out of California so Plank
"attempted to call California or my dispatch, but they couldn't find any record of it" (R.
212: 79).
Wilkinson was the backseat passenger (R. 212: 64). He gave Plank the name of
"Bob Wilkinson" and a date of birth (R. 212: 65). When Deputy Williams arrived he told
Plank that it was Jack Wilkinson (R. 212: 66). Plank then ran a warrants check on Jack
Wilkinson with the date of birth he was subsequently given (R. 212: 66).
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Deputy Williams arrived on the scene with his canine "a couple of minutes" after
he was called and deployed his dog while Plank "was writing the traffic citation" (R. 212:
65, 79). When pressed on cross examination Plank indicated that it was "two to five
minutes" (R. 212: 81). The dog indicated on the car's driver-side exterior and the
occupants were told to step out of the vehicle (R. 212: 65, 82-83). All three occupants
"were searched" (R. 212: 65).
Plank testified that when Wilkinson was quickly "pat down" for weapons (R. 212:
66). No bulky objects were found (R. 212: 67). Plank could not remember if he was the
one to frisk Wilkinson (R. 212: 83). After he was handcuffed and placed under arrest,
Wilkinson was searched thoroughly and a little blue bag containing a white crystal
powder was found and pulled out of his right front pocket (R. 212: 67, 89, 91). Plank
made a rhetorical comment like, "What do we have here?" (R. 212: 69, 92). Plank
testified that Wilkinson responded with, "if he would have remembered it was there in his
pocket he would have thrown it away. It had been left in his car by a friend" a couple of
days ago and he had it in his pocket (R. 212: 69, 94). Plank included this statement in his
report (R. 212:69).
Plank testified that had he finished writing the citation before the canine showed
up the vehicle would have been free to leave (R. 212: 80). He couldn't remember if there
was anything from a fast food restaurant in the vehicle (R. 212: 202).
2. Testimony of Brandon Burgen
Brandon Burgen is an officer assigned to the Utah County Major Crimes Task
Force (R. 212: 99). On February 8, 2005 he was partnered with Plank and providing
9

surveillance on a drug house where an automobile pulled into the driveway and then left
again (R. 212: 99-100, 105). It was dark and Burgen could not tell if anyone exited the
vehicle or went into the house (R. 212: 105). They "waited for a few minutes until it left
and then started to follow it" (R. 212: 100). The car was speeding so Plank initiated a
traffic stop (R. 212: 100). Both officers exited their vehicle and Plank spoke with the
driver (R. 212: 100). Plank got the occupants' information and asked him to run warrants
and license validity checks (R. 212: 101). One of the names he was given was "Bob
Wilkinson" but he couldn't find any record when he ran the checks from his vehicle (R.
212: 101, 108).
When Williams arrived on the scene he informed them that it was Jack Wilkinson
(R. 212: 102). Burgen doesn't know how long it took between the initiation of the traffic
stop and Williams' arrival on the scene (R. 212: 108). Williams ran his canine around the
car and at some point the occupants were asked to step out of the vehicle (R. 212: 102).
Burgen did a frisk of the driver (R. 212: 102).
Some time later Wilkinson was handcuffed and searched by Plank (R. 212: 103).
Subsequently he was handed a little blue bag taken he assumes from Wilkinson's pocket
(R. 212: 103, 111).
3, Testimony ofRhett Williams
Detective Rhett Williams is employed by the Utah County Sheriffs Office who on
February 8, 2005 was working as a canine handler (R. 212: 112). That night he was
called to a scene where Plank and Burgen had made a stop (R. 212: 113). When he got
the call he was approximately on Center Street in Provo on the west side and it took him
10

a few minutes to get to the scene (R. 212: 113). When he arrived the other officers
"informed me just what was going on" (R. 212: 113). At their request his dog sniffed the
exterior of the vehicle and had "indications" on it (R. 212: 113). The occupants were
taken out of the vehicle as a result of the indication (R. 212: 115). The dog sniffed the
vehicle's interior and also indicated on it (R. 212: 118). An indication means that an odor
of drugs is present (R. 212: 119).
Williams advised Plank and Burgen of Wilkinson's true name (R. 212: 114).
4. Testimony of Lane Kritzer
Lane Kritzer is also employed with the Utah County Sheriffs Office and on
February 8, 2005 was assigned to the task force (R. 212: 130-31). He, too, was a canine
officer but his dog was imavailable at the time (R. 212: 134). That night he was called to
assist Plank and arrived on the scene as Williams was putting his dog back in his vehicle
(R. 212: 131). He was present when a handcuffed Wilkinson was searched by Plank (R.
212: 132). He saw Plank locate a blue plastic baggie in Wilkinson's right front pocket
(R. 212: 132, 137). On cross-examination he clarified that his memory as to the exact
location on Wilkinson that the baggie was found was refreshed by a meeting with the
other officers on the case (R. 212: 138). Plank asked Wilkinson, "What is this?" or
something similar (R. 212: 133). Wilkinson responded by indicating that it did not
belong to him but he had put it in his pocket (R. 212: 133). A meeting with the officers
involved prior to trial refreshed Kritzer's memory and independent of that meeting he has
no recollection of Wilkinson's exact response to Plank's question (R. 212: 135, 136).
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5. Testimony of Kevin Smith
Kevin Smith is a State Crime Lab employee (R. 212: 122). He tested the contents
of the bag and found that it contained methamphetamine weighing 20 milligrams (R. 212:
124-25). He cannot tell if something has been field tested unless it is marked as such (R.
212: 126). There was no such marking in this case (R. 212: 126).
6. Testimony of Janice Marie (Fusco) Wilkinson
Janice Marie Fusco Wilkinson married Jack Wilkinson on April 11, 2006 (R. 212:
143, 153). She was with him on the night of February 8, 2005 when they were pulled
over (R. 212: 144). She believes they had just come from Wendy's because his father
wanted a hamburger (R. 212: 144). She ordered chili (Id.). She didn't have a driver's
license so they were being driven by Novetta, a friend of hers (R. 212: 145). As they
were driving back home they were stopped (R. 212: 145). When the stop occurred and
while they were waiting for the officers to do their work she was eating her chili (R. 212:
146). She initially gave the officers her sister's name (R. 212: 154). She did not have
identification on her and only remembers Wilkinson giving a name (R. 212: 159).
After 10-15 minutes a uniformed officer arrived with dogs (R. 212: 147, 157). He
knew Jack by name (R. 212: 150). The dog scratched on the driver's side and they were
asked to get out of the car (R. 212: 148). After the dog finished searching the inside of
the car they were thoroughly frisked (R. 212: 148-49, 161). Janice felt humiliated and
uncomfortable with it (R. 212: 149). The officers "patted you down and stuff, and then
they stick their hands in your pockets and they start looking around" (R. 212: 164).
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Janice testified that it took more time to frisk Jack "because he had more pockets" (R.
212: 165).
Wilkinson was searched again and she watched the officer "pull a bag out from I
don't know where" and ask something like, "What's this?" (R. 212: 152, 170-71). She
doesn't recall Jack saying anything in reply, only that he was in shock (R. 212: 171). She
couldn't believe they found something in the second search when nothing was located in
the earlier search (R. 212: 153). Janice believes it was the officer who was acquainted
with Jack who searched him (R. 212: 166).
At some point the officers asked her "why I was hanging out with people like that"
meaning Jack and Novetta (R. 212: 147-48).
7. Testimony of Jack Wilkinson
On the night of February 8, 2005 Novetta gave Wilkinson and Janice a ride to
Wendy's (R. 212: 180). On the way back to his dad's house they were pulled over by an
unmarked car (R. 212: 181). They hadn't stopped anywhere else (R. 212: 181). Officer
Plank asked Novetta for a driver's license and she indicated to him that she was driving
on suspension but gave him the insurance and registration information (R. 212: 181).
Plank went back to his vehicle and then the canine came within five minutes (R. 212:
181-82). After the canine arrived Plank walked back to the vehicle and "asked our
names, and I told him, 'Yeah—you know, I'm Bob,' I can't remember. Janice said she
was Sandra or something or—her sister. Then they run the dog around the car" (R. 212:
182).
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The dog jumped up in Novetta's window (R. 212: 182). They were asked to get
out of the car and the dog was run on the interior of the vehicle (R. 212: 182). Wilkinson
was told to put his hands on the hood of the unmarked sports utility vehicle (R. 212: 184).
Then "'the officer—I think it was Plank, he was patting me down. He goes 'What's this?'
I says, I don't know, a cigarette lighter and a pocketknife and keys or change, you know,
whatever was in my pocket at the time" (R. 212: 185). He thought it was his right front
pocket because he's right handed (R. 212: 185). The officer reached in and emptied his
four pockets on the hood of the car (R. 212: 185-86). Afterwards, Wilkinson returned the
items to his pockets (R. 212: 185). They didn't check the front coin pocket on his jeans
the first time (R. 212: 191). Wilkinson testified this was done by "Officer Plank. He
wasn't in a uniform, though. He was in plain clothes" (R. 212: 185-86). No
methamphetamine was found during this search (R. 212: 187).
When the officers found out his real name he was told he was under arrest for a
warrant (R. 212: 187). He was handcuffed and "then they—he reached in my right front
pocket (not the coin pocket) and then just pulled out a baggie and says, 'Oh, what do we
got here?' I didn't see no baggie or nothing, but that's what they said, you know. I
didn't see nothing, but he says, 'What have we got here?'" (R. 212: 187, 199). Wilkinson
testified that he responded with, "'What, there's nothing there,'... because I know there
was nothing. He just emptied my pockets just prior to that, you know" (R. 212: 188).
Wilkinson denied any knowledge of the baggie to the officer (R. 212: 188). He also said
something like, "If I would have—if I would have known it was—you know, if I would
have had that in my pockets I would have gotten rid of it... I had plenty of time to get rid
14

of it" (R. 212: 189). At trial Wilkinson testified he had no knowledge of where the
methamphetamine came from (R. 212: 189). He was subsequently transported to the jail
(R. 212: 189). Novetta was allowed to drive with her license on suspension with Janice
(R. 212: 189).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The request for a canine unit, which prolonged the length and scope of a routine
traffic stop for speeding, was not justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion and
therefore violates the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. In addition, all evidence discovered after that unlawful detention must be
excluded as fruits of the poisonous tree.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING WILKINSON'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects citizens from
unreasonable seizures. U. S. Const., Amend. IV. "'Stopping an automobile and
detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure5 within the meaning of [the Fourth]
Amendment ], even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention
brief.5" State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, % 28, 63 P.3d 463 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979)). To determine whether such a
traffic stop is reasonable is a two step process: One, "[w]as the police officer's action
justified at its inception?55 Two, "[w]as the resulting detention reasonably related in
15

scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place?" Hansen,
2002 UT 125 at If 29; State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131-32 (Utah 1994).
A traffic stop is justified when it is incident to an observed traffic violation.
Hansen at ^j 30; Lopez at 1132. "[W]hen an officer stops a vehicle for a traffic violation,
he may briefly detain the vehicle and its occupants while he examines the vehicle
registration and driver's license." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991)
(quoting State v. Schlosser, 114 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). "The length and scope of
the detention must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered
its initiation permissible.'" Id (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct 1868,
1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 905 (1968)). "In justifying the particular intrusion the police
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880). It takes more than an inchoate and
unparticularized hunch to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard. Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1969). See also, State v. Markland, 2005 UT
26, H 10, 112P.3d507.
In this case the car Wilkinson was in was pulled over by Officer Plank for
speeding 35 miles per hour in a 25 mile per hour zone (R. 208: 5-6). Officer Plank
testified at the preliminary hearing that he had no reason to believe there was narcotics in
the vehicle (R. 208: 25). Nonetheless, he called for a canine unit "because it's his job"
and he intended to conduct a "thorough investigation" on the vehicle (R. 208: 13; 212:
71, 74, 76). Subsequently the exterior of the vehicle was searched by the dog and when it
16

indicated on the driver's door, the interior was searched, too (R. 208: 13-15; 212: 65, 8283). No drugs or contraband were found in the vehicle (R. 208: 14). All three occupants
of the vehicle, including Wilkinson, were frisked but no contraband was discovered (R.
208: 18; 209: 22-23). Wilkinson was subsequently handcuffed when an arrest warrant
was discovered. He was searched again and a little baggie with methamphetamine was
found in his right front pocket (R. 208: 6-7; 212: 67, 89, 91).
Wilkinson filed a motion to suppress evidence claiming that Officer Plank's
request of a canine unit, and the subsequent search by the dog, exceeded the permissible
scope of the traffic stop for speeding; and that this particular intrusion was not supported
by specific and articulable suspicion of criminal activity (R. 103-97). After a
suppression hearing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 127-23).
In his decision the trial court correctly noted, "the key issue is whether by calling
for the canine unit the officer extended the detention beyond what was necessary to deal
with the speeding violation" (R. 126). The trial court went on to conclude that "the
duration of the stop was not extended by the canine sniff, not even by the few seconds it
took to call for the dog. The expansion of the investigation to include the drug dog did
not constitute an illegal extension of the initial stop. The maximum ten minute detention
for the vehicle and driver for speeding was justified by the ordinary inquiries and citation
writing necessitated by the traffic violations" (Id.). However, Wilkinson asserts that it is
not merely a question of time or length but also scope. Johnson, 805 P.2d at 763.
The trial court based his ruling on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005), and stated that
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but for this decision "the result may have been different" because "Utah law provides in
general that expanding the scope of detention beyond its original purpose without
reasonable suspicion exceeds the appropriate scope of that detention" (R. 125).
Furthermore, because the "canine search and traffic investigation were simultaneous" the
trial court found no distinction between the facts of this case and those of Caballes,
namely that in Caballes the canine unit arrived on the scene without a request from the
investigating officer as opposed to this case where Plank actively sought out the canine
unit.
In Caballes, police officers stopped a suspect based on probable cause that the
vehicle was speeding. 834 S.Ct. at 836-37. The investigating officer radioed dispatch to
report the stop and a second trooper overheard the transmission and immediately went to
the scene with his narcotics-detection dog. Id. at 836. The defendant was detained for
approximately ten minutes while one officer wrote him a warning citation and the second
officer walked the dog around the car. Id The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the
denial of the motion to suppress because the canine sniff was performed without specific,
articulable facts to suggest drug activity and thus unjustifiably enlarged the scope of the
routine traffic stop. Id at 836-37. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on
the question: "Whether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion
to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop."
Id at 837. The Court went on to state that official conduct that does not compromise
legitimate privacy interests is not subject to the Fourth Amendment, and that there is no
legitimate interest in possessing contraband. Id at 837. "Accordingly, the use of a well18

trained narcotics-detection dog... during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not
implicate legitimate privacy interests." Id. at 838.
However, in reaching its holding the Court noted, "A seizure that is justified solely
by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it is
prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission." Caballes, 834
S.Ct. at 837. Because the state courts had carefully reviewed whether the investigating
officer "had improperly extended the duration of the stop to enable the dog sniff to
occur," the Court accepted "the state court's conclusion that the duration of the stop in
this case was entirely justified by the traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to
such a stop." Id.
Wilkinson asserts that the facts in this case are sufficiently distinguishable to
Caballes to require a different result. In Caballes the length and scope of the stop was
not prolonged whatsoever by the dog sniff. The investigating officer did not request the
canine unit and in no way participated in the activities surrounding the dog sniff.
Another officer overheard the investigating officer's dispatch and voluntarily reported to
the scene. The investigating officer simply went about his business of writing the
warning ticket while the second officer ran the dog around the vehicle.
In this case, however, Officer Plank, as noted by the trial court, "actively
requested assistance from the canine unit" (R. 124; 208: 13, 21-22; 212: 74). Moreover,
it was his stated intent to conduct a "thorough" narcotics investigation on the vehicle and
its occupants in spite of the fact that he had no reason to suspect drug activity (R. 208:
14; 212: 76). He called for the canine unit approximately a minute into the stop (R. 212:
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71, 77). In addition, Detective Williams, the canine officer who reported to the scene,
testified that when he arrived at the scene he was informed about what was "going on"
(R. 212: 113).
The trial court's conclusion that the "duration of the stop was not extended by the
canine sniff, not even by the few seconds it took to call for the dog" (R. 125) is
erroneous. First of all, his conclusion that the call only took "a few seconds" is not
supported by the factual record. Wilkinson asserts it is unclear how long the call took.
Moreover, the call did not take place while waiting for any information from dispatch.
The call was placed during the first minute or so of the stop because Plank was intent on
conducting a thorough narcotics investigation despite having no reasonable suspicion of
drug activity. In addition, once Williams arrived it took an unspecified amount of time
for him to be informed by the investigating officers of what was "going on." Therefore,
unlike Caballes, the justified seizure for speeding became unlawful because it was
prolonged by the investigating officers' active pursuit of a thorough narcotics
investigation. And clearly, not being subjected to unlawful detentions is a legitimate
interest protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Because of the significant factual differences in this case, Caballes is not
applicable here. See, cf, United States v. Ladeaux, 454 F.3d 1107, n.3 (10th Cir. 2006)
("In Caballes, the Supreme Court held that the use of a dog-sniff during a lawful traffic
stop is not unconstitutional where the sniff does not extend the length of the detention....
The salient difference between Caballes and this case, however, is that there was no order
in Caballes comparable to Chatfield's request directed at the occupants of the vehicle in
20

this case. Ladeaux objects not to the dog-sniff, but rather to the request; Caballes simply
does not reach this question.") Therefore, traditional Fourth Amendment analysis
applies. The investigating officers in this case, by their own admission, had no "specific,
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warranted]" turning a traffic stop for speeding into a "thorough"
investigation for drug activity, and the lawful traffic stop became an unlawful detention.
Johnson, 805 P.2d at 763 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880).
Accordingly, because of the Fourth Amendment violation all evidence obtained as
a result of that violation must be suppressed. "Evidence obtained by police exploitation
of a prior illegality is tainted by the violation of a person's constitutional rights."
Hansen, 2002 UT 125 at ^ 62 (citations omitted). The purpose of excluding such
evidence is to "compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590, 599-600, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 Led.2d 416 (1975) (citation omitted). See also Hansen
at 1f 62. Here the purpose of the illegal conduct was to conduct a search of the vehicle
and subsequently Wilkinson's person. Suppressing the evidence clearly will have the
desired deterrent effect. Moreover, there were not intervening factors that would mitigate
the illegality. Lastly there was no significant lapse in time between the initial illegal
detention and the searches of his car and person. Hansen atfflf64-69. Therefore, he
asserts that exclusion of all evidence obtained as a result of the unlawful seizure and
detention must be suppressed.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Wilkinson requests that this Court reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress, vacate his conviction, and remand this case to the Fourth District Court for
further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of August, 2007.

Margaret P.<£mdsa;
Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South,
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 30th day of August, 2007.

Counsel for Appellant

22

ADDENDA

23

tfiZh

1"aicmUlstm

Cou

«

of Utah County, State of Utah

DEC 0

2t)Q5

nAA>

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C<
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
SUPPRESS
Plaintiff,
Case No. 051400711

vs.

Date: December 8,2005

JACK WILKINSON, JR.,
Defendant.

Judge Samuel D. McVey

Defendant's Motion to Suppress came befoie the court on November 29, 2005. Curtis
Larson, Esq., appeared for the State and Deborah Hill, Esq., appeared for the defense. The
parties stipulated to use of the preliminary hearing transcript and also presented other testimony
at the hearing. After careful consideration of the evidence and the memoranda and arguments of
counsel, the Court enters its Order Denying the Motion to Suppress.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On February 8, 2005, Officer Jeff Plank stopped a speeding vehicle. Defendant was

a passenger in the vehicle. He was in the backseat behind the driver. Another passenger sat on
the passenger's side in the front. .
2.

Officer Plank approached the driver who immediately informed him she had a

suspended license. Officer Plank got her name as well as the names of defendant and the other
passenger. He returned to his unmarked vehicle to write a citation and run all of the names for
valid licenses. Here, the Court makes a presumption his reason for running the passengers'
names was to determine whether they could drive if the driver was disqualified from doing so.
3.

Before writing a citation and calling information into dispatch, and immediately

upon his return to his police car, Officer Plank requested over the radio that a canine unit come
to the scene. He made the request to another detective.
1

-Deputy

4.

It took approximately two minutes for the canine unit to arrive. Upon arrival, the

handler ran the dog around the car in which defendant was sitting and it alerted on the driver's
side. This process took about two minutes.
5.

The entire time defendant was at the scene before the canine finished its sniff of the

vehicle was six to ten minutes. During this six to ten-minute time frame, Officer Plank was
working continuously on the speeding citation and waiting for a call back from dispatch on the
status of the driver's license, with the exception of the few seconds it took to call for the dog
when he first returned to his car.
6.

The canine alerted on the driver side of the vehicle at which point the officer, and

other officers who had then arrived, had defendant and the others step out of the car. Officers
subsequently located methamphetamine on defendant's person. Defendant was arrested on an
outstanding warrant.
DISCUSSION
Defendant moved to suppress the results of the search on Mr. Wilkinson by claiming the
Officer was unjustified in detaining the vehicle which Mr. Wilkinson was a passenger for the
canine search. Initially, the Court notes it does not address whether Officer Plank actually
detained defendant himself before the dog arrived. The parties did no raise this issue.
(Admittedly, as a passenger in the car on a cold winter day defendant may have had little
incentive to get out of the car and walk home. However, there was no evidence of anyone being
detained except the driver. The Officer merely asked defendant what his name was (defendant
gave a wrong first name).)
Defendant argues the encounter between Officer Plank and defendant amounted to a level
two detention and Officer Plank unlawfully extended the scope of the detention by requesting the
canine unit during a traffic stop involving only speeding and driving on suspension, with no
suspicion of drug activity. Regarding this argument the key issue is whether by calling for the
canine unit the officer extended the detention beyond what was necessary to deal with the
speeding violation. Accordingly, the time taken for the stop and the activities of the officer are
key factors bearing on the defense's claim. (Defendant conceded on his other argument
contending a lack of post-dog sniff reasonable suspicion.)
2

At the evidentiary hearing on this matter the witnesses disagreed over the time taken for
the stop. Officer Plank stated that from the time he stopped the vehicle to the time he gave the
driver the citation(after the dog ran around the car) it took approximately "six, seven, eight
minutes, something like that." (Prelim. Transcript at 22). He estimated it took one minute to
conduct the initial stop, speak with the vehicle occupants, go back to his unit and call for the
canine. The canine arrived in about two minutes. It then took two minutes for the dog to search
the exterior of the vehicle. Further, he stated he was continuously writing his citation and
continuing his investigation for the speeding and driver's license, violations during the time the
dog arrived and ran around the car. He was also waiting for dispatch to call back with
information on the status of the driver. Thus, he did not detain the car for longer than the time
ordinarily required to investigate and cite the speeding and suspended license violations. (See,
M a t 23-24).
On the other hand, the driver and other passenger testified they estimated the time of the
stop at fifteen minutes, although it could have been ten. They remembered sitting in the car for a
long time before the dog arrived.
Given the discrepancy in testimony and the fact no dispatch logs were presented, but
weighing the credibility of the witnesses, the Court determines six to ten minutes elapsed from
the time the vehicle stopped until the canine finished running around the car. However, during
that six to ten minutes, Officer Plank was actively working on his citation and waiting for
information to arrive from dispatch on the suspended driver's license. Accordingly, the duration
of the stop was not extended by the canine sniff, not even by the few seconds it took to call for
the dog. The expansion of the investigation to include the drug dog did not constitute an illegal
extension of the initial stop. The maximum ten minute detention of the vehicle and driver for
speeding was justified by the ordinary inquiries and citation writing necessitated by the traffic
violations.
Admittedly, the result may have been different were it not for the recent United States
Supreme Court decision in Illinois v. Caballes, 534 U.S. _ , 125 S.Ct 824 (2005). Utah law
provides in general that expanding the scope of detention beyond its original purpose without
reasonable suspicion exceeds the appropriate scope of that detention.
3

We can find no authority supporting an abandonment of the rule requiring that any
further detention or investigation, beyond what is necessary to control the scene,
be '"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference
in the first place.'" Chapman, 921 P.2d at 450 (quoting Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 9, 88 S. Ct. at 1878-79)). Support for this position can
be found in State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991), where the Utah Supreme
Court "held that running a warrants check on a passenger in an automobile that
had been properly stopped exceeded the appropriate scope of detention."
Chapman, 921 P.2d at 453 (emphasis omitted) (citing Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764).
Thus, even a "minimal intrusion" requires the police officer to provide a basis for
the action. . ..
State v. Valdez, 2003 UTApp. 100, para.20, 68 P.3d 1052, 1058-59. Notwithstanding this
statement of Utah law, Illinois v. Caballes provides that using a narcotics detection dog during a
lawful traffic stop does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy and is thus not subject
to the Fourth Amendment. Caballes, supra, 524 U.S. at

, 125 S.Ct. at 858. The Caballes court

reversed an Illinois Supreme Court holding that use of the dog "unjustifiably enlarg[ed] the scope
of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation." Id. at 836-37.
Defendant seeks to distinguish Caballes from the instant case noting that in Caballes the
canine unit simply arrived on the scene without a request from the investigating officer whereas
in the instant case Officer Plank actively requested assistance from the canine unit. This is
certainly a well-thought-out argument. Given the fact, however, that Officer Plank did not hold
the car longer than necessary to complete the speeding and suspended license investigation nor
hold it at any time for the sole purpose of having a canine unit arrive, the Court does not believe
the distinction compelling in this case. The canine search and traffic investigation were
simultaneous.
//
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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Suppress is denied.
DATED this

1

day December, 2005.
BY THE COURT

SAMUEL D. M
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